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Abstract. Even though both Ernst von Glasersfeld, the founding father of radical 
constructivism, and his epistemological alter ego, Heinz von Foerster, one of the 
principal architects of second-order cybernetics, would both repeatedly stress the 
formative importance of communication, neither would ever model communication 
as a phenomenon per se. I will propose a first modelling of communication as seen 
through the stereoscopic lens of these two schools of thought. I will first present, 
discuss and evaluate how communication is traditionally modelled. This will serve as an 
informed backdrop when I proceed to integrate the common denominators pertaining 
to communication from relevant works of both scholars. In addition to the fact that both 
would willingly profess to the ‘Linguolaxis’ of Maturana and Varela, i.e., that humans 
exist suspended in communication, two basic assumptions have proven formative. 
Firstly, that communication is perceived as a flux, as an almost William-James-like 
‘stream of communication’. Secondly, and this is more in the vein of Heraclitus, that both 
communicators and communication alike undergo transformations in the process of 
immersion. This implies favouring a view of communication in which communication 
is a perpetual oscillation between ongoing reciprocal perturbations (Glasersfeld), 
that occur over time, and the endeavours to re-establish (cognitive) homeostasis 
(Foerster). The latter must not be reduced to either mere compliance, as it were, i.e., 
that the ‘other’ does as s/he is told, or to the mutual understanding of a dominance-free 
communication of a Habermasian persuasion, but rather in the pragmatic notion of 
‘compatibility’ (Glasersfeld). For illustrative purposes I will end this paper by translating 
these notions into a model depicting what I have labelled co-actional communication, 
in effect forging an exemplar.
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1. Modelling communication – three formats in the history of 
ideas of modern communication theory
Etymologically speaking, the term ‘communication’ has Latin origin and is 
sometimes made to refer back to communicatio or message. This is often the 
case in university textbooks focusing on a narrower, instrumental view on 
com munication. Where authors have a broader outlook on communication, 
the term is said to refer back to communis esse or being together. In the former 
perspective, communication is seen as a malleable tool, something to be designed 
and employed in the service of specific interests. In the latter, it becomes the 
very medium  – evanescent though it may be  – in which humans, as social 
beings, live. In order to get a handle on an entity as ubiquitous, pervasive, and 
yet as amorphous as communication, i.e., simultaneously avoiding the Scylla of 
communis esse while not being sucked into the Charybdis of communicatio, one 
needs an angle, a perspective, as it were (Gasset 1961[1923]). The perspective, 
that I evoke, is that of the history of ideas of modern communication theory2. The 
reading of the history of ideas that I refer to has been elevated to a doxa of the 
field of communication theory (e.g., as propagated in university textbooks such 
as Beebe, Beebe, Ivy 2004; Windahl, Signitzer, Olson 2009; Littlejohn, Foss 2011; 
West, Turner 2018). 
 In a somewhat crude generalization, this doxa consists of two major com-
ponents – albeit not situated at the same level of abstraction. The first is a timeline 
that stipulates that communication theory has undergone a transition of its general 
formats: from viewing communication as action via viewing communication as 
interaction to viewing communication as transaction; each of which, in turn, gives 
rise to a prototypical (Kleiber 1993) communication model. Real-life examples 
of instances of communication as action could be monologues, communication 
as interaction would add some kind of feedback loop (e.g., question–answer 
sequences after the monologue), whereas communication as transaction would 
be seen as a cooperative endeavour (e.g., a negotiation between the ‘sender’ and 
the ‘receiver’ as to the ‘meaning’ of an instance of communication). Although this 
timeline seems to depict a straightforward, incremental growth in both complexity 
and scope of the disciplinary understanding of what communication ‘is’, a caveat 
must be issued here. For even if these appreciations of communication, and the 
models that illustrate them, each may hold a set of distinctive features, they do in 
fact (also) co-exist and overlap in various ways – in theory as well as in practice. 
2 I take modern communication theory to begin with the seminal work of Shannon and 
Weaver (1949) on the mathematical model of communication. 
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It is, therefore, imperative that they not be perceived of as mutually exclusive or 
incommensurable in a (crudely rendered) Kuhnian sense (Kuhn 1995[1962]) 
but rather as evolutionary expansions (Lakatos 1978 et passim) of one another 
(see Kastberg 2015b for further details). The second component is a consensus in 
the extant literature that the basic fabric of any communication model depicting 
human-to-human dialogical communication is made up of a triad of factors, i.e., 
communicators, context and content. That is, whatever intricate elaborations 
may be brought to bear on a specific appreciation of communication, from an 
admittedly reductionist point of view this triad establishes a common ground. 
This triad will become obvious in the coming sections, even if the individual 
authors may use different terminologies. I will present, discuss and evaluate the 
three appreciations of communication one by one and, for illustrative purposes, I 
will anchor my presentation in the communication models that characterize them. 
1.1. Communication viewed as action
As action, communication – whatever the modality – is a linear process from a 
sender to a receiver (e.g., Theodorson, Theodorson 1969). Communication-wise, 
the format is oriented towards the sender, i.e., communication is primarily a 
matter of sending out messages while trying to avoid “noise” (Shannon, Weaver 
1949) (Fig. 1). 
Figure 1. A rudimentary modelling of communication as action.
Strictly speaking, it is not of primary interest what the receiver may retain from the 
communication, since, again strictly speaking, it goes without saying that (ideally) 
the receiver retains what is transmitted. The primary interest, consequently, is 
that the sender delivers, as it were. This idea corresponds with the idea of the 
receiver as “an empty vessel” (e.g., Feiman-Nemser, Remillard 1995), or the 
“recitation model” (e.g., Eisner 1991) of communication. Formal, monologuous 
lectures would be examples of this kind of communication. Here everybody in the 
Noise(s) Noise(s)
Sender / Source Target / ReceiverMessage
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audience is offered the same kind of information, and in the same way. In terms 
of retention or “deposit” (Dewey 1933), we have no way of knowing in situ what 
an audience may have learned from such an experience. From the point of view 
of communication theory, it is imperative that the underlying assumption (be it 
conscious or unconscious) which reads “that language transfers human thoughts 
and feelings” (Reddy 1979: 286) be subject to critique. For, as Reddy (1979: 286)3 
elaborates: 
Aft er all, we do not literally “get thoughts across” when we talk, do we? Th is 
sounds like mental telepathy or clairvoyance, and suggests that communication 
transfers thought processes somehow bodily. Actually, no one receives anyone 
else’s thoughts directly in their minds when they are using language. 
It is rather the case that communication “seems […] to help one person to 
construct out of his own stock of mental stuff ” (Reddy 1979: 286) knowledge of 
his/her own. This in turn leads to the communication-theoretical insight that as 
action this kind of communication does not elicit interaction, it may, however, 
elicit re-action. Returning once more to the lecture, applauding (or booing, for 
that matter) is an audience’s ritualistic reaction to any lecture; however, applauding 
per se does not mean ‘understood’, ‘accepted’ and ‘hereafter my actions will comply 
with what I have just heard’. The applause (or the lack of it) merely gives an 
indication as to the satisfaction of the audience. Satisfaction concerning how the 
lecture was delivered, however, is no guarantee of having understood, accepted 
or retained it. In order to gauge a deposit in the ‘other’ – or any change in the 
‘other’, for that matter –, follow-up activities of an interactive nature, e.g., control 
questions, quizzes, or the like, are required. 
1.2. Communication viewed as interaction
In communication-theoretical terms, we may conclude that whereas action may 
be necessary, it is by no means sufficient if the goal is one of ensuring some kind 
of deposit, some kind of change in the ‘other’. This is also the main reason for 
why – and this then forms the transition from action to interaction – in real-
life communication activities of the action type there is a growing tendency to 
insert or add an interactive component of sorts. It may be deliberately adding 
an interactive quality to the talk, for instance in the sense that a talk uploaded to 
YouTube allows for feedback – albeit sometimes asynchronously – from Internet 
3 Italics in the original.
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viewers. Theoretically, then, it becomes a prerequisite for communication viewed 
and carried out as interaction that it cannot take place merely because a sender 
has sent out a message, so to speak, but first once a receiver has – in one way or 
the other – acknowledged being targeted. Or, as Schramm (1954) would probably 
phrase it, not until feedback has been detected (Fig. 2).
Figure 2. A rudimentary model of communication as interaction.
Whereas the action model of communication, also sometimes called the trans-
mission model, views communication as a one-way linear process in which A 
sends a message to B, the interactional model is still linear, but the linearity is 
bidirectional. For communication to take place, two messages are involved. And 
whereas the action model stipulates a fixed constellation of sender and receiver, 
the interactional model implies role-shifting. There is still an initial message, 
which is being sent from sender to receiver, but for interactional communication 
to take place, the receiver must – in some shape or form – be seen to interact 
with the message, e.g., be seen to respond. This means that the original receiver 
becomes the sender of an ensuing communicative exchange, the original sender 
becomes the receiver  – and so on and so forth. In interaction, then, sender 
and receiver must enter into a mutually recognized relationship of ‘agent’ and 
‘reactant’ (Anderson, Meyer 1988: 161). Compared to the one-way linearity of 
communication as action, communication as interaction features a bidirectional, 
asynchronous linearity, a feedback loop of sorts, in which A and B take turns in 
playing the role of sender and receiver respectively – much as in a game of ping-
pong. 
Sender / Source
Target / Receiver
Message
Target / Receiver
Sender / Source
Message
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 Noise is also a factor in the interactional model. Apart from acknowledging 
the ‘mechanical’ noise that might stem from medium or channel, the interactional 
model ups the ante and sees the sender’s and the receiver’s respective fields 
of experience as a potential source of noise. In fact, the degree to which 
understanding a message is possible in the first place is a function of said sender’s 
and receiver’s respective field of experience. In line with a very basic semiotic 
vocabulary, the sender encodes his/her message, while the receiver then decodes 
it. The degree to which the receiver’s decoding is ‘correct’ – i.e., mirrors what was 
intentionally encoded – is contingent on the extent to which the receiver’s field 
of experience overlaps with that of the sender. The reasoning goes that fields of 
experience may be too diverse to allow for communication. In contrast to the 
action model, which does not per se allow for gauging the deposit of an instance 
of communication, the deposit in the receiver resulting from interaction can be 
appreciated (if not meticulously measured) in the feedback loop itself. The pivotal 
point being if – or to what extent – the receiver responds to what s/he just heard 
or experienced in a way that corresponds to what was intended by the sender or 
in a way that conforms to whatever is sanctioned by any contextual constraints in 
question. 
1.3. Communication viewed as transaction
The transactional view on communication (e.g., Barnlund 1970; Kincaid 1973) is 
in two important respects quite different from the previous two communicative 
formats. First of all, when viewing communication as transactional it does not 
suffice to talk about sending out messages nor asynchronous responses to them. 
Communication viewed as a transactional endeavour is a process in which 
commu nicators are simultaneously engaged in the process of sending and re-
ceiving messages. This, among other things, entails abandoning the traditional 
roles of sender and receiver in favour of ‘communicators’. The transactional model 
of communication has also abandoned the inherent linearity of messages being 
sent – be it of a mono- or a bidirectional persuasion – in favour of depicting 
communication as a spiral. West and Turner (2018: 12) put it like this: 
In the linear model of communication, meaning is sent from one person to 
another. In the interactional model, meaning is achieved through the feedback of 
a sender and a receiver. In the transactional model, people build shared meaning. 
Viewing this building of shared meaning as the end point of transactional 
communication, eventually led Rogers and Kincaid (1981) to propose what still 
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counts as the illustrative capstone of the transactional format and label it “the 
convergence model of communication” (Fig. 3).
Figure 3. A rudimentary model of communication as transaction.
In this model of transactional communication, it is apparent that there are 
forces at play in communication that exert an almost gravitational pull on the 
communicators, a pull that seemingly compels them to gravitate towards each 
other, i.e., to build shared meaning, to reach consensus or mutual understanding. 
In some university textbooks, this is literally depicted as a Venn diagram, where – 
set-theory-like – the two individual fields of experiences of A and B, respectively, 
overlap to create a shared field of experience (e.g., West, Turner 2018). Where 
the interaction model leans towards pre-Gadamer hermeneutics, the transactional 
model leans towards the Gadamer version in which horizons are fused. The notion 
of being-together-in-communication paired with the ideal of two, in principle 
equal, communicators striving for mutual understanding, also paved the way 
for acknowledging that even though the term of choice is still ‘message’, the 
message no longer possesses meaning a priori. Neither is meaning a matter of 
correct decoding. Meaning is something that is assigned to messages by cognizing 
agents in a process of negotiation. This, needless to say, is in line with the telos of 
communicative action that we find explicated in the writings of Habermas (1981), 
as well as in Putnam’s ideal of the deliberative and participatory democracies of late 
modern societies of a Western persuasion (Putnam 2004)4. For all its domination-
free prowess, however, this model is, in and of itself, a normative ethical statement, 
4 As I have dealt extensively with models of communication and their underlying philo-
sophies/ideologies elsewhere, I will refrain from doing so here, but merely point to two relevant 
papers: Kastberg 2015a, 2015b. 
Communicator A Communicator B
Mutual 
understanding
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and, as such, it imposes on communication – as well as on communicators – a 
non-negotiable incentive for consensus5. 
2. En route to a fourth communication format 
by way of a few critical remarks
In referring to communication as co-actional, I build on the above critical pre-
sentation of the currently dominating format of transactional communication. In 
order to infuse a productive angle into my critique, I take my point of departure 
in and build upon three insights that I consider overlooked in the extant literature. 
The first is Dance’s (1967) modelling of communication as helical, the second is 
the specific vein of constructivism inherent in the transactional format, the third 
is the lack of understanding of what I believe to be crucial relational aspects in 
appreciating communicators.
 In his “helix model” of communication, Dance (1967)6 proposes that all present 
instances of communication should be seen as cumulative, as building on and 
as being influenced by all past communications. This communicative historicity, 
however, does not imply either a verbatim or a mechanistic reproduction of the 
past; it is rather the case that past communications leave traces that rub off on all 
future communications. What Dance’s modelling of communication also shows is 
that communication is not driven towards consensus. In his illustration, there is no 
inward pull, no spiralling towards mutual understanding, but rather an orientation 
outwards, an orientation spiralling toward future communications (Fig. 4). 
Figure 4. Dance’s helix model of communication.
5 Whereas few people of a democratic persuasion would want to question what seems to be 
an altogether comely (political) ideal, this ideal is, nevertheless, also laying down the (ethical) 
law for what constitutes “good” communication, what “good” communication ought to be – as 
well as for its opposite.
6  In all likelihood, the underlying idea goes back to George Herbert Mead and the so-called 
Chicago School of ‘symbolic interactionism’, of which he was the (posthumous) founder.  
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Dance sees communication as a dynamic, in principle, never-ending, ever out-
wards-spiralling process, which – in that capacity – features an almost evolutionary 
trajectory of development. In addition to giving the concept of communication a 
certain – and in my book, needed – organic plasticity, this also seems to highlight 
the almost commonsensical notion that while mutual understanding may be a 
laudable goal of communication, it is neither a prerequisite for communication 
nor for the end of communication. 
 The second critical remark pertains to the formative aspect of the so-called 
CCO principle, i.e., the most recent offspring of the transactional appreciation 
of communication. The CCO principle stands for “communication constitutes 
organization” (e.g., Putnam, Nicotera, McPhee 2009; Schöneborn, Blaschke 2014). 
The CCO principle in many ways echoes Bateson’s credo that we communicate 
content as well as relationship. The constitutive force of communication implies 
that in communication we discursively co-construct not only, say, the identity 
of communicator A and communicator B – one or both of whom could be an 
individual or an organization –, communication also constitutes, alters, maintains 
power and status amongst communicators as well as the identity, power, status 
etc. of the ones talked about – be it individuals, organizations or indeed any other 
entities. Even if the slogan-like statement, that communication constitutes reality, 
is not meant to mean that communication alone would produce the keyboard 
on which I am currently writing, or the study in which I sit, it is, nevertheless, 
tarnished by the brush of transubstantiation. Heeding this, one of the champions 
of the CCO principle therefore also cautiously puts forward this caveat: 
Advocating a communicative constitution of reality does not amount to falling 
into some degenerate form of constructivism (or solipsism). It means, on the 
contrary, that for instance, preoccupations, realities, and situations get expressed 
and translated in what we say or write. (Coreen 2012 quoted in Schöneborn, 
Blaschke 2014: 303)
What this boils down to is that the CCO principle is curiously on a par with Heinz 
von Foerster7, when he – almost half a century ago – said that what we constitute 
communicatively is not reality per se, but exactly those descriptions of reality that 
our conceptual and perceptual interfaces – as well as our motor skills – would 
allow us to: 
I could by no means claim in all seriousness that the lectern, my wrist watch, 
or the Andromeda Nebula is being computed [i.e., constructed in an ontological 
7 Born as Heinz von Förster.
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sense] by me. At the most, one could say that a “description of reality” is computed, 
because with my verbal references (“lectern”, “wristwatch”, “Andromeda”), I have 
just demonstrated that certain sequences of motion of my body combined with 
certain hissing and grunting sounds, permitted listeners to interpret these as a 
description. (Foerster 2003[1974]: 232)
In the same critical vein, it worries me that holding that communication consti-
tutes reality – and not, say, descriptions of it – seems to be perilously close to 
an input-output-logic of a causal nature (or to the ‘communicatio’ introduced in 
the beginning of this paper, or – indeed – to the linear model of communication 
discussed above). The strategic corporate journalist (e.g., Kounalakis Banks, Daus 
1999), for instance, may be endowed with exquisite public speaking skills, but try 
as s/he may, there is no ‘open sesame’ that would always ensure that a message is 
understood and its intentions complied with by a desired stakeholder. There is, 
alas, no algorithm for human understanding and no communicative panacea for 
non-compliance. The Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) is said to be 
the father of this admittedly cynical yet quite astute observation: 
What is thought is not necessarily said
What is said is not necessarily heard
What is heard is not necessarily understood
What is understood is not necessarily accepted 
What is accepted is not necessarily carried out
What is carried out is not necessarily remembered
The third and last critical remark, before I turn to modelling my co-actional 
appreciation of communication, pertains to the very core of transactional 
communication itself, i.e., the apparent easiness with which the built-in drive 
towards consensus is taken for granted. According to both the transactional 
and the CCO view of communication, the communicators are engaged in a 
process of co-constructing mutual understanding of reality and of one another. 
However, this appreciation of communication does not – to any large extent, at 
any rate – deal with the relational aspects of communicators apart from stating 
that the “transactional model […] requires each of them to understand and to 
incorporate the other’s field of experience into his or her life” (West, Turner 
2018: 13). It seems – even if I am being a tad polemic here – that as a byproduct 
of obtaining mutual understanding, of reaching a shared field of experience, 
of communicatively constituting a common reality, communicator A is being 
reduced to a trivialized avatar of communicator B.
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 Needless to say, there is more to the relational aspects of ‘ego’ and ‘alter’ than 
this. In an attempt to approach this ‘more’, I turn to classical sociology. One of the 
main claims in the work of Schütz is the appreciation that the ‘other’ (or ‘alter’) 
is – mutatis mutandis – like me (‘ego’) (Schütz 1976[1969])8. While this notion is 
highly problematic (and for many different reasons), it is, however, not altogether 
without merit. Even if mirroring the ‘other’ on oneself may lead to a crude 
sociological reductionism, intuitively doing so is nevertheless sensible in order 
for each and every one of us to be able to navigate in a world full of, well, ‘others’. 
Speaking from the standpoint of communication theory, what is important here is 
that Schütz points to the fact that the relational qualities of ‘alter’ are probably not 
altogether different from those of ‘ego’. In turn giving rise to viewing the ‘other’ as 
being as dynamic and as relational an entity as ‘ego’. 
 This, in turn, found its crystallization point in the Parsonian notion of “double 
contingency” (e.g., Parsons, Shils 1951: 105 et passim). Double contingency is 
basically an elaboration on the relational phenomenon that when communicating 
with the ‘other’, ‘ego’ recognizes the ‘other’ and at the same time ‘ego’ recognizes 
that the ‘other’ recognizes ‘ego’. What double contingency brings to bear on the 
understanding of the relationship between communicators is the fact that in the 
recognition of the ‘other’ there are expectations of an interactional kind; i.e., ‘ego’ 
has expectations towards the ‘other’ but, at the same time, ‘ego’ expects that the 
‘other’ has expectations towards ‘ego’. Despite its seemingly relational merits, 
it is obvious that Parsons’ double contingency is in line with the interactional 
appreciation of communication. The ‘other’ is always seen from the viewpoint of 
‘ego’, and the expectations are always the expectations of ‘ego’ – also when ‘ego’ 
has expectations towards the expectations of ‘alter’. And whether the expectations 
are met is to be established based on the feedback that ‘ego’ receives. In that 
sense, the expectations (and the expectations of expectations) are add-ons to the 
sender’s individual field of experience. So what Parsons’ interactional appreciation 
of communication apparently bars him from seeing is that it is not merely one 
communicator, i.e., the sender or ‘ego’, that establishes a double contingency. They 
both do it – and simultaneously at that. In effect turning the double contingency 
into a double double contingency (Kastberg 2011). In a pre-operative interview, 
for instance, surgeon and patient alike establish a double double contingency 
of reciprocal expectations. The surgeon expects to be in command of expert 
clinical knowledge pertaining to the operation at hand, s/he also expects that 
the patient expects so. At the very same time, the patient, on the other hand, 
8 Naturally, Schütz did qualify this statement; see Schütz 1976[1969] for further elaborations 
of this particular concept.
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expects the surgeon to be in command of expert clinical knowledge and expects 
that the surgeon expects that the patient expects so, too, etc. In order to describe 
exhaustively or indeed to understand the relationship between communicators, 
one has to abandon the privileged position of ‘ego’ and take into consideration this 
double double contingency. 
 These discussions and critical remarks serve two purposes: They serve as a 
skeleton structure for my understanding of communication, an understanding 
that I have labelled co-actional. They also serve as a vantage point from which to 
look for kindred spirits, as it were. In the following sections, I will be adding flesh 
to the skeleton structure by way of presenting and integrating select ideas from 
second-order cybernetics and radical constructivism. Ideas that are congenial to 
the ones I have sketched out in my critical remarks. I will begin by introducing 
my epistemological ur-point of departure, as it were, namely Heinz von Foerster’s 
notion of the logical machines. 
3. Trivial and non-trivial machines
Even though Heinz von Foerster, one of the principal architects of second-order 
cybernetics, would stress the crucial importance of communication (e.g., Foerster 
2003[1993]), he would never model communication as a phenomenon per se. 
However, he would, as a rule of thumb, resort to formalism whenever he needed to 
clarify concepts and relations between them. Two of his most formative formalisms 
are his two “logical machines”, i.e., the trivial and the non-trivial machine. Both 
of which to me – for all intents and purposes – are also communication models:  
Von Foerster uses the word “machine” to denote a conceptual devise used to 
carry out computation. Contemplating things together must be carried out in 
something, and for simplicity’s sake the calls that “something” a machine. (Segal 
2001: 85)
These machines are conceptual frameworks that serve two main purposes. They 
“provide the most direct approach to linking a system’s external variables, e.g., 
stimulus, response, input, output, cause, effect, to the system’s internal states and 
operations” (Foerster 1981: 154–155). As machines in his sense, their “formal 
interpretation is left completely open” and may be used to depict the operational 
modalities of a whole system or of integral parts of systems. The trivial machine 
has three parts (Fig. 5): an input (X), a transfer function (F), and an output (Y). 
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Figure 5. Heinz von Foerster’s trivial machine.
As an example, consider the light switch: “The input is flipping on. The transfer 
function is allowing the electricity to flow through the circuit. And the output is 
the bulb’s filament getting hot and our seeing light” (Segal 2001: 86). The main 
quality of a trivial machine is that it always operates in a predictable manner. In 
fact, its sole raison d’être is its complete reliability. Every time the light switch is 
flipped on, the light turns on. In case the light should not turn on, a ‘trivializateur’ 
is summoned to (re-)trivialize the machine. In this case, an electrician would hold 
the position as ‘trivializateur’ making sure that the input–transformation–output–
logic functions predictably again. At a somewhat more abstract level, Foerster 
also considers math teachers ‘trivializateurs’ in as much as they, too, are called 
upon to turn (unruly) children into trivial machines, who will, for instance, after 
having been appropriately trivialized, dutifully answer questions such as ‘what is 
2 x 2?’ with a trivialized ‘4!’; and not, say, a non-trivial ‘green’ (Foerster 1999). In 
other words, trivial machines are ubiquitous and their underlying logic furnishes 
us with a compass of predictability when navigating our otherwise unpredictable, 
hypercomplex environment. This predictability supports (and/or restrains) us in 
all aspects of our existence, from science to everyday life (Table 1).
Table 1. Input – transfer function – output. Adapted from Segal 2001: 94.
Input Transfer Function Output
1 Cause Law of nature Eff ect 
2 Stimulus Central nervous system Response 
3 Motivation Character Deeds 
4 Goal System Action 
5 Minor premise Major premise Conclusion 
6 Dependent argument Independent argument Function
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Nevertheless, relying solely on the logic of our trivial machines bars us from 
appreciating the contingency of that which could be or the benefits of system 
breakdowns, so to speak. The trivial machine operates on an input-A-always-
renders-output-B kind of logic; it is analytically determinable and wholly 
independent of previous operations. In that sense, it resembles the action model 
of communication. As we saw, however, the linearity of the action model is not in 
line with current theoretical appreciations of communication; nor is it compatible 
with what we intuitively understand to take place during the back and forth of 
any real-life dialogue. Consequently, the trivial machine will not be pursued any 
further. 
 In contrast to the trivial machine, the non-trivial machine has a game-changing 
internal state (Z), i.e., what makes this machine non-trivial is its true recursivity: 
every time it operates, it changes its rule of transformation (Fig. 6). 
Figure 6. Heinz von Foerster’s non-trivial machine.
At a very abstract level Foerster argues – in line with the biosocial constructivism 
of Maturana and Varela (2015[1984]) – that a human being as a living system is, in 
fact, a non-trivial machine, forever suspended in computing “a self-perpetuating 
[social] reality, or – as Maturana and Varela state – [being] autopoietic” (Brier 
1996: 231). At a somewhat more mundane level, the non-trivial machine comes 
to the fore every time we enter into a dialogical exchange (be it with a coworker, 
a spouse or a stranger etc.) and walk away with a ‘deposit’ in a Deweyian sense. 
That is, every time we have learned something new, we have changed our internal 
state, hence our ‘rule of transformation’ for future engagements. Looking closer 
at the non-trivial machine, we see that in many ways it shares a common starting 
point with Dance’s helix model of communication. It does so in acknowledging 
that communication is not so much a matter of sending and receiving messages 
but of communicators, as well as what they converse about, evolving over time. 
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Based on these insights, the non-trivial machine adds a substantial layer of 
sophistication to the previously presented models of communication – including 
the convergence model –, which is also why the non-trivial machine will make 
up the structural backdrop of the co-actional modelling of communication in the 
following sections.
4. Modelling communication as co-actional
Distilling a point of departure from the above presentations, discussions and 
evaluations, I present the modelling of communication that I have labelled co-
actional. As is the case for all models, this is a “minimal hypothetical machine 
[…] not for the purpose of implementation, but for the purpose of illustrating 
ideas” (Fischer 2014: 370). My minimal hypothetical machine is a rudimentary 
modelling of the reciprocal dynamics of dialogical, of co-actional communication. 
I will begin by showing the model, in effect using it as an anchor, and then proceed 
to present and discuss its core elements and their relationships in some detail (Fig. 
7). 
Figure 7. A rudimentary modelling the reciprocal dynamics of dialogical communication.
4.1. A triple helix of I, you, and it
Going ad fontes, so to speak, I have allowed myself to begin by stipulating my 
version of the aforementioned triad (see Section 1). That is, to stipulate that 
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any dialogical human-to-human communicative encounter entails two9 com-
municators and that, which they converse about. In the words of Danish 
philosopher Ole Thyssen: I, You and It, respectively (2016). When it comes to 
modelling co-actional communication in this sense, I do in fact envision its 
constitutive factors as three trajectories that in their synthesis form a triple helix, 
that is, a triple-stranded, interdependent, spiralling structure in which the strands 
all pivot around the same constant, i.e., time (I will return to the factor time 
presently). This interdependency, however, does not imply that the factors merge; 
nor is that foreseen. The idea of the triple helix of co-actional communication is, of 
course, a metaphor borrowed from the double helix of the DNA strands (Watson 
1980[1968]). Dwelling for a moment on the basics of DNA, it is well known that 
certain nucleotides in the strands punctually bind together across the double helix, 
a binding that is referred to as a base pair. In much the same way, the trajectories 
of the three factors of co-actional communication can also be said to be linked 
punctually. What DNA research calls base pairing, however, is – in the case of 
co-actional communication – rather a punctual linking by means of what radical 
constructivists refer to as perturbations (Glasersfeld 198910). Even if the ‘I’ exists 
autopoietically, the ‘I’ only makes sense thanks to a ‘You’, and they both only make 
sense against the backdrop of an ‘It’ (Thyssen 2016). Or, to quote Foerster, when 
he would talk about triangular interdependencies in general: “You need all three to 
have all three” (Foerster 2003[1979]: 284). In that sense the triple helix becomes a 
self-supporting, triangular construction, in which the interdependencies allow the 
three factors to stay suspended for as long as communication takes place. 
4.2. The factor time t
This, in turn, establishes the stepping-stone to the factor time t that I have 
inserted into the co-actional model. This is in stark contrast with the previously 
discussed communication models; there, time was either taken for granted  – 
and hence not recognized – or time was perceived of as ‘anytime’ or maybe as 
‘all the time’  – in effect conflating past, present and future. Instead of taking 
time for granted, and thus in all probability consciously or unconsciously over-
looking this factor, I explicitly view time as a critical factor when it comes to 
9 Naturally, there may be – and oft en are – more than two communicators (and sometimes 
communication is intra-personal), but since the number of participants per se does not alter 
the theoretical foundation of this conceptualization, I refrain from widening the scope at this 
point.
10 Th is idea is introduced at a disciplinary level of abstraction in Kastberg 2014. 
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understanding what communication ‘is’ and what it ‘does’. Whereas – for all sorts 
of analytical purposes – isolating (and for all intents and purposes wanting to 
cryo-conserve) communication in a time-less model may be legitimate, this take 
on communication bars us from evoking the radical constructivist, i.e., Kantian, 
notion of time as being an a priori. In sum, it bars us from seeing the “inseparable 
relationship between time and meaning” (Tada 2018: 1). For, as Tada (2018: 7) 
continues, all “self-referential systems […] are […] temporalized”. In fact, the 
notion of temporalization is crucial for the understanding of the fourth format of 
communication, for it is this undercurrent of an ever-progressing and irreversible 
time t that allows us to reconnect with the primary theorem of the non-trivial 
machine. That is: every time the system – in casu, communication – operates, it 
changes its rule of transformation. In the illustration above, the effect of time is 
depicted by means of elevated numbers, numbers that are meant to symbolize 
the progressive changes in I, You and It, respectively, over time, i.e., for as long 
as communication takes place. In the next section, I will address some of the 
‘mechanics’ of such changes. 
4.3. Perturbations, eigenvalues and compatibility 
Speaking from the point of view of systems theory, it seems to be generally 
accepted that “if irreversible processes should occur [then] the entropy of the 
system […] must increase, hence, as time goes on, the system would disorganize 
itself ” (Foerster 2003[1960]: 8). Although that may be the case in many an instance 
of communication, that is not necessarily the outcome of a communicative 
engagement – even if it may drag out. As we saw earlier, communication cannot 
command causality, i.e., communication is not a trivial machine, but in the 
process of communication, correlations may very well emerge. In the vocabulary 
of second-order cybernetics these correlations equal ‘eigenvalues’, i.e., “those stable 
dynamic modes a […] system drifts into when it is perturbed again and again in 
the same way” (Brier 1996: 236). Foerster (2003[1977]: 265) defines eigenvalues 
like this: 
Eigenvalues represent equilibria, and depending upon the chosen domain of the 
primary argument, these equilibria may be equilibrial values (“Fixed Points”), 
functional equilibria, operational equilibria, structural equilibria, etc. 
Perturbations in communicative engagements (Glasersfeld 1989) may take on 
many forms. Verbal indications of perturbations could be questions as to under -
standing and meaning, they could be conversational repair mechanisms, state-
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ments of consent, utterances of disagreement etc. Such perturbations trigger – at 
a basic biosocial level – endeavours on behalf of one or both communicators to 
re-establish equilibrium in the communication flux (Glasersfeld 2015[1995]: 234), 
spur the drift towards eigenvalues. If two people are able to converse in, say, the 
English language, then it is because they have been exposed to and participated 
in this kind of communication for so long that eigenvalues have emerged – the 
eigenvalues in question being e.g., English grammar, lexicon and pronunciation. 
These eigenvalues, however, must not be mistaken for the shared meaning or the 
mutual understanding of the transactional view. This very idea(l), which translates 
into some kind of conflation of identity of A and B, is deemed inadmissible from 
the point of view of radical constructivism. Here “[u]nderstanding [the ‘other’ is] 
always a matter of compatibility, not of identity” (Glasersfeld 2015[1995]: 23011). 
Understanding in a radical constructivist view means that communicator A builds 
up a conceptual framework that, in the situation at hand, A deems compatible with 
what A surmises communicator B seems to have meant. This kind of compatibility, 
however, cannot be vetted as to its correctness, i.e., as corresponding to an 
ontological reality or to what communicator B actually meant – provided B is 
aware of that in the first place. Compatibility in this sense can only be interpreted 
by A on the basis of B’s ensuing action (be it verbal or otherwise), i.e., if B acts 
in such a way that A is satisfied that A’s understanding does not interfere with 
or contradict A’s expectations as to B’s ensuing action (Glasersfeld 2015[1995]: 
232–233) then there is compatibility. Here, however, we must not forget that what 
is deemed an adequate response by A could indeed be prompted by any (other) 
number of reasons in B – in effect highlighting the inherent and acknowledged 
indeterminacy of co-actional communication. This acknowledged indeterminacy, 
in turn, of co-actional communication is congenial to the two tenets of radical 
constructivism (Glasersfeld 1990: 22):
1.  (a) Knowledge is not passively received either through the senses or by way of 
communication; (b) knowledge is actively built up by the cognizing subject.
2.  (a) Th e function of cognition is adaptive, in the biological sense of the term, 
tending toward fi t or viability; (b) cognition serves the subject’s organization of 
the experiential world, not the discovery of an objective ontological reality.
As such, it mirrors Piaget’s credo that “intelligence […] organizes the world by 
organizing itself ” (as quoted in Glasersfeld 1982, Footnote 2). 
11 My translation of the German “Verstehen [ist] immer eine Sache des Zusammenpassens und 
nicht des Übereinstimmens” (Glasersfeld 2015[1995]: 230).
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4.4. Suspended in communication
It is exactly this being immersed in and navigating a social world that frees radical 
constructivism and second-order cybernetics from the haunting specter of being 
perceived as a mere academic exercise in solipsism. Foerster puts it like this in an 
interview:
Of course, every human being is tied into a social network, no individual is 
an isolated wonder phenomenon but dependent on others and must  – to say 
it metaphorically  – dance with others and construct [social] reality through 
communality. (Poerksen 2003: 23) 
If “communication is not just a peripheral epiphenomenon of human actions but 
the primary mode of explaining social reality” (Schöneborn, Blaschke 2014: 302), 
then communication is not a state, nor a medium or another ‘something’ that 
we enter. Analogously to Gadamer’s claim that we do not enter the hermeneutic 
circle, we are already living in it, we are beings-in-communication. In that sense, 
pairing fundamentals from second-order cybernetics and radical constructivism 
with insights from the field of communication and linguistics is relatively 
straightforward. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, or linguistic relativity hypothesis12, 
for instance, shows some traits that are quite clearly in tune with what Maturana 
and Varela would later call “languaging” or “Linguolaxis”  – a term that they 
would sometimes alternate with “being-in-the-language” (Maturana, Varela 
2015[1984])13. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis holds that the structure of a given 
language affects the cognition of its speaker and thus that a speaker’s worldview is 
relative to said speaker’s language:
It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the 
use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specifi c 
problems of communication or refl ection. Th e fact of the matter is that the ‘real 
world’ is to a large degree unconsciously built up on the language habits of the 
group. (Sapir 1970: 69)
12 Th is was never really proposed as a hypothesis as such by its two main proponents, Edward 
Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf, but it has, nevertheless, entered into the extant 
literature under that label.
13 My translation of the German “in-der-Sprache-sein” (Maturana, Varela 2015[1984]); 
a notion, needless to say, which leans heavily on Sartre’s (and for that matter: Heidegger’s) 
‘being-in-the-world’.
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This echoes Danish Nobel Prize Laureate Niels Bohr’s credo that “we are suspended 
in language” (Rasmussen 1987: 22–23). But instead of pursuing the idea of 
language into the realm of linguistics or indeed linguistic determinacy – which is 
certainly not implied in either Bohr’s nor Matura’s or Varela’s homage a language – 
I allow myself to superimpose unto their notion that what we are ‘suspended in’ 
is in fact not ‘languaging’ in particular, but indeed rather ‘communicating’ in 
general14. As beings suspended in communication, we are, as we have seen, not 
merely the deferent reproducers of firm and stable communications; alluding to 
Wittgensteinian language-game theory, we are forever suspended in the process of 
co-producing the co-actional ‘game’ of communication as we play it. 
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Моделирование взаимной (реципрокной) динамики диалогической 
коммуникации: О философском подводном течении коммуникации 
радикального конструктивизма и кибернетики второго порядка
Несмотря на то, что и Эрнст фон Глазерсфельд, основоположник радикального конст -
руктивизма, и его эпистемологическое альтер-эго, Хайнц фон Фёрстер, один из глав-
ных архитекторов кибернетики второго порядка, неоднократно подчеркивали форми -
рующее значение коммуникации, – ни тот, ни другой никогда бы не смо дели ровали 
коммуникацию как явление само по себе. В своей работе я впервые предлагаю модели -
рование коммуникации, рассматриваемое через стереоскопическую линзу этих двух 
школ мысли. Для этого я сначала представлю, проанализирую и оценю, как тради-
ционно моделируется коммуникация. Это послужит информационным фоном для 
интеграции общих обозначений, относящиеся к коммуникации, из соответствующих 
работ обоих ученых. В дополнение к тому, что оба ученых с готовностью восприняли 
принцип лингволаксиса (linguolaxis) Матураны и Варелы, т.е. то, что люди существуют 
в замкнутом пространстве своей коммуникации, два основных постулата оказались 
формирующими. Во-первых, коммуникация воспринимается как поток, почти как 
«поток общения» у Уильяма Джеймса. Во-вторых, и это в большей степени относится к 
Гераклиту, что и коммуникаторы, и общение претерпевают трансформации в процессе 
погружения в него. Это подразумевает предпочтение такого взгляда на общение, при 
котором общение «является» вечным колебанием между продолжающимися взаимными 
возмущениями (Глазерсфельд), которые происходят с течением времени, и – столь же 
вечными  – попытками восстановить (когнитивный) гомеостаз (Фёрстер). Однако, 
гомеостаз не должен сводиться к простому соглашению, т.е. к тому, что «другой» делает 
то, что ему говорят, или к поддержанию хабермасовской идеи об общем понимании 
свободной от доминирования коммуникации. А скорее в прагматическом понятии 
«совместимости» (Глазерсфельд). В иллюстративных целях – и для того, чтобы несколько 
уменьшить (гипер-)сложность этого восприятия коммуникации – я закончу эту работу 
переводом этих понятий в модель, изображающую то, что я назвал со-деятельной (co-
actional) коммуникацией.
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Dialoogilise kommunikatsiooni vastastikuse dünaamika 
modelleerimine: Radikaalse konstruktivismi ja teise astme küberneetika 
kommunikatsioonifi losoofi lisest allhoovusest
Ehkki nii radikaalse konstruktivismi rajaja Ernst von Glasersfeld kui ka tema epistemoloogiline 
alter ego, teise astme küberneerika üks peamisi ülesehitajaid Heinz von Foerster, rõhutasid 
korduvalt kommunikatsiooni alustrajavat tähtsust, ei modelleerinud kumbki neist kom-
munikatsiooni kui nähtust per se. Oma artiklis pakun välja kommunikatsiooni esmakordse 
modelleerimise nähtuna läbi nende kahe mõttekoolkonna prisma. Selleks tutvustan kõigepealt, 
kuidas kommunikatsiooni on traditsiooniliselt modelleeritud, analüüsin seda ning annan sellele 
hinnangu. See toimib informeeritud taustana, millelt liigun edasi lõimima kommunikatsiooni 
puudutavaid ühisnimetajaid mõlema teadlase teemakohastest teostest. Lisaks tõigale, et mõle-
mad kirjutanuks meelsasti alla Maturana ja Varela linguolaxise printsiibile, s.t, et inimesed 
eksisteerivad kommunikatsioonist ümbritsetutena, on määravaks osutunud kaks põhilist 
eeldust. Esiteks see, et kommunikatsiooni tajutakse voolamisena, peaaegu „kommunikatsiooni 
vooluna“ William Jamesi laadis. Teiseks, ning see meenutab pigem Herakleitost, et nii kom-
munikatsioon ise kui ka selles osalejad teevad sellesse süüvimise protsessis läbi muutusi. Sellest 
ilmneb, et soositakse vaadet kommunikatsioonile, mille kohaselt ongi tegu pideva võnkumisega 
aja jooksul toimuvate pidevate vastastikuste häirituste (Glasersfield) ning samavõrra pidevate 
püüdluste vahel taaskehtestada (kognitiivset) homöostaasi (Foerster). Kuid homöostaas, 
mida ei tohi taandada ei lihtsaks n-ö soostumiseks, mis tähendab, et teine teeb seda, mida tal 
kästakse, ega Habermasi-laadse domineerimisvaba kommunikatsiooni ühiseks mõistmiseks, 
ilmneb pigem pragmaatilises „ühilduvuse“ mõistes (Glasersfeld). Illustratiivsel eesmärgil – 
ning et sellise kommunikatsioonimõistmise (hüper)keerukust veidi kahandada  – lõpetan 
artikli, tõlkides need mõisted mudeliks, mis kirjeldab seda, mida nimetan koostegutsevaks 
(co-actional) kommunikatsiooniks, s.t sisuliselt valmistades selle näidise. 
